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1710A TREATISE CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGEby George BerkeleyTO THE RIGHT HONOURABLETHOMAS, EARL OF PEMBROKE, &c.,KNIGHT OF THE MOST NOBLE ORDER OF THE GARTERAND ONE OF THE LORDS OF HER MAJESTY'SMOST HONOURABLE PRIVY COUNCILMY LORD,You will perhaps wonder that an obscure person, who has not thehonour to be known to your lordship, should presume to address youin this manner. But that a man who has written something with a designto promote Useful Knowledge and Religion in the world should makechoice of your lordship for his patron, will not be thought strange byany one that is not altogether unacquainted with the present stateof the church and learning, and consequently ignorant how great anornament and support you are to both. Yet, nothing could haveinduced me to make you this present of my poor endeavours, were Inot encouraged by that candour and native goodness which is sobright a part in your lordship's character. I might add, my lord, thatthe extraordinary favour and bounty you have been pleased to showtowards our Society gave me hopes you would not be unwilling tocountenance the studies of one of its members. These considerationsdetermined me to lay this treatise at your lordship's feet, and therather because I was ambitious to have it known that I am with thetruest and most profound respect, on account of that learning andvirtue which the world so justly admires in your lordship,MY LORD,Your lordship's most humbleand most devoted servant,GEORGE BERKELEYPREFACEPREFACEWHAT I here make public has, after a long and scrupulous inquiry,seemed to me evidently true and not unuseful to be known- particularlyto those who are tainted with Scepticism, or want a demonstration ofthe existence and immateriality of God, or the natural immortalityof the soul. Whether it be so or no I am content the reader shouldimpartially examine; since I do not think myself any farther concernedfor the success of what I have written than as it is agreeable totruth. But, to the end this may not suffer, I make it my requestthat the reader suspend his judgment till he has once at least readthe whole through with that degree of attention and thought whichthe subject-matter shall seem to deserve. For, as there are somepassages that, taken by themselves, are very liable (nor could it beremedied) to gross misinterpretation, and to be charged with mostabsurd consequences, which, nevertheless, upon an entire perusalwill appear not to follow from them; so likewise, though the wholeshould be read over, yet, if this be done transiently, it is veryprobable my sense may be mistaken; but to a thinking reader, I flattermyself it will be throughout clear and obvious. As for thecharacters of novelty and singularity which some of the followingnotions may seem to bear, it is, I hope, needless to make anyapology on that account. He must surely be either very weak, or verylittle acquainted with the sciences, who shall reject a truth thatis capable of demonstration, for no other reason but because it isnewly known, and contrary to the prejudices of mankind. Thus much Ithought fit to premise, in order to prevent, if possible, the hastycensures of a sort of men who are too apt to condemn an opinion beforethey rightly comprehend it.INTRODUCTIONINTRODUCTION1. Philosophy being nothing else but the study of wisdom andtruth, it may with reason be expected that those who have spent mosttime and pains in it should enjoy a greater calm and serenity of mind,a greater clearness and evidence of knowledge, and be less disturbedwith doubts and difficulties than other men. Yet so it is, we seethe illiterate bulk of mankind that walk the high-road of plain commonsense, and are governed by the dictates of nature, for the most parteasy and undisturbed. To them nothing that is familiar appearsunaccountable or difficult to comprehend. They complain not of anywant of evidence in their senses, and are out of all danger ofbecoming Sceptics. But no sooner do we depart from sense andinstinct to follow the light of a superior principle, to reason,meditate, and reflect on the nature of things, but a thousand scruplesspring up in our minds concerning those things which before weseemed fully to comprehend. Prejudices and errors of sense do from allparts discover themselves to our view; and, endeavouring to correctthese by reason, we are insensibly drawn into uncouth paradoxes,difficulties, and inconsistencies, which multiply and grow upon usas we advance in speculation, till at length, having wanderedthrough many intricate mazes, we find ourselves just where we were,or, which is worse, sit down in a forlorn Scepticism.2. The cause of this is thought to be the obscurity of things, orthe natural weakness and imperfection of our understandings. It issaid, the faculties we have are few, and those designed by naturefor the support and comfort of life, and not to penetrate into theinward essence and constitution of things. Besides, the mind of manbeing finite, when it treats of things which partake of infinity, itis not to be wondered at if it run into absurdities andcontradictions, out of which it is impossible it should ever extricateitself, it being of the nature of infinite not to be comprehended bythat which is finite.3. But, perhaps, we may be too partial to ourselves in placing thefault originally in our faculties, and not rather in the wrong usewe make of them. It is a hard thing to suppose that right deductionsfrom true principles should ever end in consequences which cannot bemaintained or made consistent. We should believe that God has dealtmore bountifully with the sons of men than to give them a strongdesire for that knowledge which he had placed quite out of theirreach. This were not agreeable to the wonted indulgent methods ofProvidence, which, whatever appetites it may have implanted in thecreatures, doth usually furnish them with such means as, if rightlymade use of, will not fail to satisfy them. Upon the whole, I aminclined to think that the far greater part, if not all, of thosedifficulties which have hitherto amused philosophers, and blocked upthe way to knowledge, are entirely owing to ourselves- that we havefirst raised a dust and then complain we cannot see.4. My purpose therefore is, to try if I can discover what thosePrinciples are which have introduced all that doubtfulness anduncertainty, those absurdities and contradictions, into the severalsects of philosophy; insomuch that the wisest men have thought ourignorance incurable, conceiving it to arise from the natural dulnessand limitation of our faculties. And surely it is a work welldeserving our pains to make a strict inquiry concerning the FirstPrinciples of Human Knowledge, to sift and examine them on allsides, especially since there may be some grounds to suspect thatthose lets and difficulties, which stay and embarrass the mind inits search after truth, do not spring from any darkness andintricacy in the objects, or natural defect in the understanding, somuch as from false Principles which have been insisted on, and mighthave been avoided.5. How difficult and discouraging soever this attempt may seem, whenI consider how many great and extraordinary men have gone before me inthe like designs, yet I am not without some hopes- upon theconsideration that the largest views are not always the clearest,and that he who is short-sighted will be obliged to draw the objectnearer, and may, perhaps, by a close and narrow survey, discern thatwhich had escaped far better eyes.6. In order to prepare the mind of the reader for the easierconceiving what follows, it is proper to premise somewhat, by way ofIntroduction, concerning the nature and abuse of Language. But theunravelling this matter leads me in some measure to anticipate mydesign, by taking notice of what seems to have had a chief part inrendering speculation intricate and perplexed, and to haveoccasioned innumerable errors and difficulties in almost all partsof knowledge. And that is the opinion that the mind hath a power offraming abstract ideas or notions of things. He who is not a perfectstranger to the writings and disputes of philosophers must needsacknowledge that no small part of them are spent about abstract ideas.These are in a more especial manner thought to be the object ofthose sciences which go by the name of Logic and Metaphysics, and ofall that which passes under the notion of the most abstracted andsublime learning, in all which one shall scarce find any questionhandled in such a manner as does not suppose their existence in themind, and that it is well acquainted with them.7. It is agreed on all hands that the qualities or modes of thingsdo never really exist each of them apart by itself, and separated fromall others, but are mixed, as it were, and blended together, severalin the same object. But, we are told, the mind being able toconsider each quality singly, or abstracted from those other qualitieswith which it is united, does by that means frame to itself abstractideas. For example, there is perceived by sight an object extended,coloured, and moved: this mixed or compound idea the mind resolvinginto its simple, constituent parts, and viewing each by itself,... [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]

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